Cold War redux
Over the final stages of World War II, the United States received multiple pleas to bomb the gas chambers at Auschwitz and the rail lines from Hungary leading to them. The government declined them all, citing the need to focus on targets aiding the Nazi war effort. Defeating the enemy war machine, officials said, was the prime objective of Allied operations, not rescuing people. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews (among the last in Europe to be deported) were exterminated.
Another calculation has been playing out for the US over the killing fields of Ukraine. As Russian forces have devastated cities and the populations within, the US has resisted calls for more direct confrontation to reduce Ukraine’s human and physical suffering. Has it been the right call? The realpolitik answer says yes. Beyond billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and defensive military equipment, an escalation to no-fly zones, fighter jets, weaponised drones or ground troops would risk a wider war with a nuclear-armed country that has shown no distinction between killing soldiers and civilians.
There is an equally important, though less obvious, reason for the same answer, and it mirrors the US experience of the last world war. At some point, the fighting in Ukraine will end, ushering in a new Cold War that will require the US to recalibrate its relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin upon a geopolitical landscape vastly changed by the war.
The post-World War II Cold War was essentially defined by each country’s growing nuclear capacity, their geographical spheres of influence and a mutual wariness based on mistrust and fear. The new US-Russia relationship will embody much of the same, but with the added contours of a Russia weakened by economic sanctions, diminished as a world trading partner and widely regarded as a pariah state. Its isolation will be acute, leaving Putin few allies beyond China, North Korea, Belarus and Syria. He will also face the opposite of what he anticipated before his Ukraine invasion. Instead of a divided NATO, the alliance has held strong, now buoyed by French President Emmanuel Macron’s re-election and with more countries – Finland, Sweden, Moldova among them – expressing interest in NATO membership. Already, the UN General Assembly has suspended Russia from the Human Rights Council.
But for all the frostiness of a Cold War Redux – a chill marked by mounting evidence of war crimes and the possibility of America in Putin’s backyard to help rebuild Ukraine, as it did Germany after World War II – the US will still need Russia as a reliable partner in critical policy areas like arms control, climate change and fighting global terrorism, even as the occasional eruption of hostilities elsewhere may drive the two superpowers into their more familiar adversarial roles.
“The United States should play both sides,” Charles A Kupchan, a professor of international affairs at Georgetown University in Washington and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in The New York Times. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks a fundamental breach with the Atlantic democracies, yet the West cannot afford to completely turn its back on Russia; too much is at stake. As during the [post-1945] Cold War, Washington will need a hybrid strategy of containment and engagement.”